von The Special Forces and Israeli Intelligence are also likely to play a more prominent role. Though destruction of the nuclear facilities may entirely be left to the IAF, Special Forces are likely to play a role in the neutralisation / elimination of key radars or command and control facilities for air defence, as Israel lacks stealth aircraft capability to take on these. Air penetration corridors may have to be cleared by Special Forces action.
However, large scale employment of Special Forces may not be likely, given the widespread nature and distance of the targets and the sheer complexity of operations involved. After all, the US Delta Force’s botched attempt to rescue hostages in Iran is not a reassuring precedent. It would all be a function of the quantum and quality of human intelligence assets available to Israel within Iran itself and the degree to which Iran’s air defences could be physically / electronically suppressed.
In sum, Israeli air attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities will be a very mammoth and extremely complex operation with huge in-built risks and serious potential for uncontrolled escalation and widening of the conflict. These constraints by themselves lessen the chances of the adoption of this option but cannot be ruled out altogether.
Given the operational and political complexities and also the uncertainties in execution and outcome, this option will be difficult, but not beyond the capabilities of the IAF. The problem area would be in dealing with the likely Iranian conventional and asymmetric responses.
Iranian response options
Briefly, Iranian response options could be analysed under two heads:
Conventional
Air defence: Iranian fighters are a mix of vintage US aircraft like the Phantoms and F‑5s as also Russian Su-22, Su-24 fighters and 40 x Mig-29s. Since, these would be operating close to their bases they would have an advantage. Hawk SAMs would pose a threat to Israeli strike packages. There are reports of Iran having Russian SA-10 and SA-15 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). However, radar cover and command and control are weak links.
Iran’s missile capabilities: Iran could hit targets in Israel, the Gulf countries, Middle East and even Southern Europe. Its missile inventory comprises:
- Shabab I: Maximum range 205 miles (330 kms)
- Shahab II: Maximum range 435 miles (700 kms)
- Shabab III: Maximum range 840 miles (1,350 kms). This puts Israel and the fringes of Europe in range. Israel and the Middle eastern Sunni states are likely to be hit by a barrge of conventional tipped missiles.
Oil tanker war II: Iran could blockade the Gulf of Hormuz. It could mine sea lanes and attack oil tankers with surface-to-surface missiles. Some 300 mines would be sufficient to close the narrow strait. Iran has some 2,000 mines. This could seriously disrupt global oil supplies and push oil prices to beyond US$ 200 a barrel. India would be particularly affected. Iranian high speed boats could launch massed swarming attacks on US warships in the closed waters of the Gulf and cause the loss of major capital ships. Iranian Kilo submarines are also a significant threat as are its Midget submarines
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Asymmetric options
- Hezbollah could open a front against Israel via Lebanon with help from Iranian Special Forces. Hezbollah has some 50,000 rockets in its armoury and could strike civilian targets all over Israel.
- Palestinian organisations could be assisted by Iran’s Special Forces (Al Quds detachments).
- Iranian Special Forces could strike targets in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as also assist the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hezbollah and Hamas could strike targets in Israel and other Middle Eastern states. All this could create a global economic crisis with the worst fallout on China, India, Japan and South Korea, the key consumers of Iran’s energy exports.
Implications for India
India is close to losing some US$ 40 billion of revenue from refining the Iranian crude at the Reliance Jamnagar refinery. Any crisis in the Persian Gulf would lead to the need to evacuate some 6 million Indian expatriates now working in the Gulf. They send home remittances worth US$ 40 billion every year. Besides a Gulf crisis could dramatically escalate the price of oil and thereby seriously impact on the Indian and global economy. The price of oil could easily cross a US$ 200 per barrel and more. Over 68 per cent of India’s oil supplies and 100 per cent of its gas are currently sourced from the Gulf region. This dependence on Persian Gulf oil and gas is largely a function of geography, spatial distance / linkages and transportation costs. Keeping in view the extreme volatility in this region, it would be prudent for India to try and diversify its sources of energy imports and possibly try to get more oil and gas from Africa, Russia and Central Asia and even Brazil and Venezuela. However this cannot be done in a short time frame as most Indian refineries are geared to deal only with Iranian crude.
Israeli or US attacks could cause Iran to make expedient tactical shifts and provide support to Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Its support to the Taliban could have a very destabilising impact on Afghanistan and by extension in Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India. In a post US withdrawal scenario from Afghanistan India would need Iran to gain access to Afghanistan. Hence India would need to keep its channels of communication open with Iran.
Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike
It may have to expedite the consolidation of its strategic petroleum reserves. Gas is going to be the primary energy source of the 21st century and our energy dependence on gas is likely to grow by leaps and bounds. India’s attempts to secure supplies of Iranian gas reserves over land routes / pipelines may need to be expedited, because of the likelihood of disruption of supplies routed through the sea. Passage through Pakistan however is another question mark. Iran and India had earlier closed ranks to support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine.
It would be therefore very much in India’s interests, as also in the regional and global interests to ensure a peaceful, n e g o t i a t e d resolution to this crisis. It would be prudent however, to make contingency plans for the worst case scenarios that may entail a diversification of our oil and gas import sources and possibly a large scale evacuation of the Indian emigrant population from the Gulf region. The base line assumption would proceed from the likely duration of the conflict and disruption of the oil supplies. The long-term spectre of a series of failed states in Asia is chilling. It would give a major boost to the forces of destabilisation and chaos and encourage non-state actors to flourish in such shatter zones of collapse. Inconclusive conventional conflicts in the Gulf could lead to the chilling prospect of the “Somalisation” of this region. This prospect is daunting both at the regional and global level and could have a paradoxical impact – that the very quest for enhanced security, leads to greater destabilisation, chaos and instability.
While air strikes on Iranian nuclear / missile complexes might neutralise assumed conventional or WMD threats, these may end up creating an entire new series of asymmetric threats. In purely military terms, the outcome of this conflict would be critical for the Chinese, as it would enable them to evaluate the impact of massed ballistic / cruise missile strikes on US naval surface combatants, especially high value targets like aircraft carriers and also the efficacy of the Kilo submarines – both, key ingredients of their access denial strategy to prevent US intervention in any hypothetical crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese may view this assault on Iran as a direct attempt to hit their economy. (China imports 22 per cent of its oil from Iran, Japan 14 per cent, India 12 per cent and South Korea 10 per cent). Are economic sanctions on Iran’s oil exports meant to hit the Chinese economy? It also has the unintended (or intended?) serious consequences for the Indian economy which India can ill afford to ignore or take lightly.
The Iraq and Afghan experience has certainly drained American political will to engage militarily overseas. Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike. Chinese reliance on energy supplies from the Gulf is very high and, as such, the impact on the Chinese economy would also be highly adverse. So would it be for the Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies. The most likely outcome of crisis in the Gulf would be a full fledged global economic recession.
About the Author
Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) — The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.
Note by the Author:
Iran has threatened that in such a strangulation scenario it would close the straits of Hormuz and trigger a global economic recession. The economies worst hit would be those of China, India, Japan and South Korea. Over the last two years India has already lost some US$ 40 billion of export revenues because the Reliance facility at Jamnagar has been prevented from refining Iranian crude oil. It is noteworthy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any closure of the Gulf of Hormuz could trigger an energy crisis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries. The price of oil could easily cross over US$ 200 per barrel and trigger a serious economic crisis not just in Asia but all over the globe
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