Israeli Attack on Iran? Dire Consequences for India

In Athens, an offi­cial of the Greek Air Force Cen­tral Com­mand, had con­firmed, that it had tak­en part in a joint train­ing exer­cise with Israel off the Mediter­ranean island of Crete. Named Glo­ri­ous Spar­tan 08, these exer­cis­es, were actu­al­ly con­duct­ed from May 28 to June 12, 2008. It was a high­ly vis­i­ble and coer­cive exer­cise intend­ed to demon­strate Israel’s seri­ous con­cern over Iran’s nuclear ambi­tions. In fact, on June 6, Israel’s Deputy Prime Min­is­ter, Shaul Mofaz, had warned that Iran would face attacks if it pur­sues what he said was its nuclear weapons pro­gramme. The Mossad Direc­tor Meir Dagan got an exten­sion till 2010 which was being linked to Israel’s like­ly plans for a strike on Iran­ian nuclear facil­i­ties. Sab­o­tage attempts have clear­ly slowed down the Iran­ian nuclear pro­gramme. How­ev­er they have also served to high­t­en Iran’s deep sense of inse­cu­ri­ty which would impel it to move faster on its nuclear weapons pro­gramme. The US and its Euro­pean allies are now going ahead with their plans to impose severe eco­nom­ic sanc­tions on Iran that tar­get its petro­le­um exports and could derail its econ­o­my. Iran has threat­ened that in such a stran­gu­la­tion sce­nario it would close the straits of Hor­muz and trig­ger a glob­al eco­nom­ic reces­sion. The economies worst hit would be those of Chi­na, India, Japan and South Korea. India is close to los­ing some US$ 40 bil­lion of export rev­enues because the Reliance facil­i­ty at Jam­na­gar has been pre­vent­ed from refin­ing Iran­ian crude oil due to its link­ages with the Amer­i­can bank­ing sys­tem. It is note­wor­thy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any clo­sure of the Gulf of Hor­muz could trig­ger an ener­gy cri­sis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Per­sian Gulf coun­tries. The price of oil could eas­i­ly cross over US$ 200 per bar­rel and trig­ger a seri­ous eco­nom­ic cri­sis not just in Asia but all over the globe. How­ev­er, our strate­gic part­ners seem least con­cerned about the poten­tial dam­age to the Indi­an econ­o­my. Appar­ent­ly their nation­al secu­ri­ty inter­ests are supreme and they couldn’t care less about ours. We are sup­posed to tame­ly sub­or­di­nate our nation­al inter­ests to their secu­ri­ty con­cerns. So far India has gone along with the secu­ri­ty con­cerns of its strate­gic part­ners but such an eco­nom­ic cri­sis would be push­ing the enve­lope too far and there is now a need for a frank dia­logue between us and our strate­gic part­ners. While our strate­gic part­ners expect us to buy their civ­il and mil­i­tary air­craft to bail out their economies, they can­not cre­ate a sit­u­a­tion which could seri­ous­ly derail the Indi­an econ­o­my. There are vital nation­al stakes involved and we must artic­u­late them to our friends who have to show some under­stand­ing. Par­tic­u­lar­ly impor­tant at this junc­ture is the fate of Afghanistan post the US with­draw­al and India would need Iran for access to Afghanistan and the Cen­tral Asian land­mass. We can­not accept a sit­u­a­tion where the crum­bling state of Pak­istan is appoint­ed as the colonis­ing pow­er for Afghanistan. At the same time how­ev­er, the Israelis have been our trust­ed strate­gic part­ners and our sec­ond largest source of mil­i­tary equip­ment and sup­plies, espe­cial­ly of crit­i­cal high-tech equip­ment which the Amer­i­cans are not pre­pared to give us direct­ly. We also need Amer­i­can sup­port to coun­ter­bal­ance the ris­ing pow­er of Chi­na. Hence the sit­u­a­tion is achiev­ing crit­i­cal mass and requires some very clear-head­ed think­ing and artic­u­la­tion of vital nation­al inter­ests that can­not be com­pro­mised. This is the time for hec­tic par­leys and dia­logue before the sit­u­a­tion spins out of control. 

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We can­not accept a sit­u­a­tion where the crum­bling state of Pak­istan is appoint­ed as the colonis­ing pow­er for Afghanistan. At the same time how­ev­er, the Israelis have been our trust­ed strate­gic part­ners and our sec­ond largest source of mil­i­tary equip­ment and sup­plies, espe­cial­ly of crit­i­cal high-tech equip­ment which the Amer­i­cans are not pre­pared to give us direct­ly. We also need Amer­i­can sup­port to coun­ter­bal­ance the ris­ing pow­er of Chi­na. Hence the sit­u­a­tion is achiev­ing crit­i­cal mass and requires some very clear-head­ed think­ing and artic­u­la­tion of vital nation­al inter­ests that can­not be compromised

The Israelis have said that they have only 9 months to stop Iran from achiev­ing nuclear capa­bil­i­ty. The Amer­i­cans they feel have only 15 months (with their supe­ri­or resources) to do so before the win­dow of oppor­tu­ni­ty clos­es final­ly. The US intel­li­gence sources how­ev­er feel the Ira­ni­ans are still some three years away from nuclear capa­bil­i­ty (cour­tesy the covert offen­sive). They are ner­vous over Iran­ian plans to retal­i­ate in kind — with covert asym­met­ric options on US soil. They have asked Israel to give them at least 10 days notice in case they plan to take out the nascent Iran­ian capa­bil­i­ties through Air strikes. A dan­ger­ous sit­u­a­tion is devel­op­ing. Amer­i­ca has total­ly elim­i­nat­ed its depen­dence on Sau­di and Gulf oil. Europe is about to cur­tail its depen­dence on Iran­ian oil cour­tesy the oil resources of Libiya and Iraq. We import 12 per cent of our oil needs from Iran and 22 per cent from Sau­di Ara­bia. Our ener­gy secu­ri­ty reliance on Sau­di Ara­bia is grow­ing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Sau­di Ara­bia and Pak­istan make it a wor­ry­ing sce­nario in case of any con­flict trig­gered by ter­ror­ist strikes or oth­er­wise in South Asia. What if a pan­icked Iran clos­es the Gulf of Hor­muz in retal­i­a­tion for the eco­nom­ic sanc­tions? What would be the impact on our ener­gy secu­ri­ty? How long would such a clo­sure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strate­gic petro­le­um reserve? 

Our ener­gy secu­ri­ty reliance on Sau­di Ara­bia is grow­ing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Sau­di Ara­bia and Pak­istan make it a wor­ry­ing sce­nario in case of any con­flict trig­gered by ter­ror­ist strikes or oth­er­wise in South Asia. What if a pan­icked Iran clos­es the Gulf of Hor­muz in retal­i­a­tion for the eco­nom­ic sanc­tions? What would be the impact on our ener­gy secu­ri­ty? How long would such a clo­sure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strate­gic petro­le­um reserve?

This arti­cle will steer clear of val­ue judg­ments on the pro­lif­er­a­tion issues involved and focus on a pure­ly mil­i­tary net assess­ment of like­ly con­flict sce­nar­ios that could emerge in the Gulf in case of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. 

This arti­cle will employ the tech­nique of pat­tern mod­el­ling to dis­cern the shape and basic con­tours of an Israeli air attack on Iran­ian nuclear facil­i­ties. Towards this end it will: 

  • Study the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osir­ak reactor.
  • Spec­u­late upon the like­ly details of an Israeli air strike option on Iran­ian nuclear facilities.
  • Briefly exam­ine Iran­ian response options .
  • Exam­ine the impact on India of such a hypo­thet­i­cal con­flict sce­nario in the Gulf.

Osir­ak redux

In a very metic­u­lous paper enti­tled “Osir­ak Redux? Assess­ing Israeli Capa­bil­i­ties to Destroy Iran­ian Nuclear Facil­i­ties”, Whit­ney Raas and Austin Lang (Inter­na­tion­al Secu­ri­ty Vol No 31. Spring 2007), had car­ried out an excel­lent analy­sis of Israel’s raid on the Iraqi Osir­ak Reac­tor of June 7, 1981.They had gone on to out­line an equal­ly cred­i­ble net assess­ment of an Israeli direct­ed strike against Iran­ian nuclear facil­i­ties. The paper is insight­ful and reveal­ing and mer­its study in detail.

On June 7, 1981, Israel had launched one of the most ambi­tious pre­ven­tive attacks in his­to­ry. Israel’s Mossad had sought to buy time by alleged­ly sab­o­tag­ing the reac­tor cores before the French com­pa­nies could sup­ply them to Iraq and assas­si­nat­ed some key Iraqi nuclear offi­cials. In Octo­ber 1980, Mossad report­ed to the Israeli Prime Min­is­ter Men­achem Begin that Osir­ak Reac­tor would be oper­a­tional by June 1981. There was intense debate in the Israeli Gov­ern­ment before the final clear­ance was given.

The Israeli Air Force employed a strike pack­age of 16 air­craft (8 x F‑15s and 8 x F‑16s). These took off from Etzion air base in the Sinai desert. Their flight pro­files were low alti­tude across the Gulf of Aqua­ba, south­ern Jor­dan and then across north­ern Sau­di Ara­bia to the tar­get. The F‑16s car­ried 2 x MK-84, 2,000 Ib bombs each with delayed action fuzes. Though these were dumb grav­i­ty bombs, the F‑16 air­craft did have onboard tar­get­ing com­put­er sys­tems that could make their deliv­ery fair­ly accu­rate. How­ev­er, such accu­ra­cy was required that the planes get close to the tar­get. The strike pack­age arrived near the Osir­ak reac­tor com­plete­ly unde­tect­ed. The F‑15s then climbed up to estab­lish a Com­bat Air Patrol (CAP) to inter­cept any Iraqi fight­ers that would attempt to chal­lenge the mission.

The F‑16s formed up at pre­de­ter­mined points to begin their bomb­ing runs. About four miles from the tar­get, the F‑16s climbed to 5,000 feet to dive at Osir­ak and release their bomb loads. Despite some nav­i­ga­tion prob­lems and Iraqi air defences, at least 8 of the 16 bombs struck the con­tain­ment dome of the reac­tor. The strike pack­age then turned and climbed to high alti­tude and returned to base along much the same route it had adopt­ed for entry. All the 16 air­craft returned safe­ly to base. The results were spec­tac­u­lar. Bomb dam­age assess­ment showed that the Iraqi reac­tor was total­ly destroyed.

Israeli strike on Iran­ian nuclear facil­i­ties: Tar­get analysis

Iran­ian tar­get sets

The Rass and Lang paper stat­ed that Iran has obvi­ous­ly learnt the lessons of the Osir­ak raid. Its nuclear facil­i­ties are wide­ly dis­persed. The paper asserts that Iran is pur­su­ing mul­ti­ple path­ways to nuclear weapons capa­bil­i­ty to include Ura­ni­um enrich­ment and Plu­to­ni­um pro­duc­tion con­cur­rent­ly. The Ura­ni­um enrich­ment path­way, it avers, is sig­nif­i­cant­ly more advanced than the Plu­to­ni­um pro­duc­tion route presently. 

As such, the paper iden­ti­fies the fol­low­ing Iran­ian tar­get sets (the three crit­i­cal Iran­ian nodes for the pro­duc­tion of fis­sile material): 

  • Isfa­han. Ura­ni­um con­ver­sion facil­i­ty at Isfahan.
  • Natanz. The large Ura­ni­um enrich­ment facil­i­ty at Natanz.
  • Arak. Heavy water (HW) plant and plu­to­ni­um pro­duc­tion reac­tors under con­struc­tion at Arak.
  • Bushehr. The paper analy­ses the pro­ject­ed plans for con­struc­tion of the light water reac­tor with Russ­ian aid at Bushehr. How­ev­er, it feels that this is not a hard­ened site and being on the coast, could be bet­ter struck by sub­ma­rine launched cruise mis­siles. A detailed analy­sis of the three ear­li­er tar­get sets would now be essential.
  • For­do. The facil­i­ty that the Rass and Lang paper did not fac­tor in was the new­ly unveiled under­ground stor­age facil­i­ty at For­do, near the holy city of Qom where sub­stan­tial amounts of low grade and mid­dle grade Iran­ian fis­sile mate­r­i­al is stored in a deep under­ground facil­i­ty some 220 ft deep under­ground (and as such beyond the capa­bil­i­ties of most bunker bust­ing bombs). It is note­wor­thy that Iran has five tons of low grade enriched Ura­ni­um which could be used to make some 5–6 bombs. It has also stock­piled 175 lbs of medi­um grade fis­sile mate­r­i­al. Israel claims Iran­ian sci­en­tists could make a bomb with­in 9 months of the deci­sion to do so and may need anoth­er 6 months to reduce its size to fit the Shabab missiles.

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