Keeping in view the aggravated nature of Global Terrorism in the 21st century, countries have responded proactively by legislating stringent new laws to deal specifically with the threat. The Indian state stands alone in its strange conviction that legal processes of an earlier century should not evolve to deal with aggravated levels of threat to civil society in the 21st century. The levels of force usage and the stringency of the laws are increasing exponentially in all other nation states. The levels of force usage by America in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya have been staggering and unrestrained. It was said that force usage norms in foreign countries cannot be applied to one’s own country. Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan have used staggering levels of force against insurgents in their own territories. The Sri Lankans waged a ruthless civil war employing offensive air and naval power, tanks and heavy artillery. The Sri Lankans have succeeded eminently in totally destroying the LTTE. It is one of the few examples of successful termination of a vicious insurgency that had reached the levels of a civil war. The scale and scope of the Sri Lankan military success raises some critical questions about our basic approach to this genre of conflict. Though the Indian manpower oriented approach is highly touted — in actual fact it has succeeded decisively only in two cases — Mizoram and Punjab. In all the other CI / CT campaigns the Indian Army has only achieved conflict management in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and to an extent even in Jammu and Kashmir. Barring the two success stories of Mizoram and Punjab, we have failed singularly to bring the conflicts to closure. This is primarily due to a lack of synergy between the civil and military components of the state. Nagaland has dragged on for over five decades and the situation is still uncertain. Manipur is still a hotbed of violence. Assam may be heading for closure but only due to unstinted support from the new government of Bangladesh. China however is renewing its arms supply to the north-eastern insurgencies and we have singularly failed to deter Jihadi attacks against our citizens. In fact our willingness to compromise in this domain now borders on the shameful. The greatest threat is the rising menace of Left Wing Extremism in the dense forest tracts of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and Gadchiroli. Some 85 per cent of India’s tribal population lives here in central and peninsular India. It is now in open revolt. The total number of terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir never crossed 4,500. The armed Maoist cadres now number over 15,000. Their expertise in IEDs is lethal and widespread. We are grossly underestimating this critical threat. Frankly it is slipping well beyond the capabilities of the Police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). The threat from China is rising with every month. A Jihadi coup in Pakistan or its implosion could create an unprecedented level of external threat. With this backdrop we cannot afford a leisurely approach to LWE, hoping that our police forces will get combatised enough over the next decade to deal with this threat. Operation Green Hunt that was launched with such fanfare was tripped up by the severe casualties inflicted on the untrained CAPFs who are neither structured nor organised for such offensive CI operations in such dense jungle terrain. The CRPF in particular lacks the operational ethos, operates mostly on a company and not a battalion basis and relies on civilian contractors for its logistics. It has unfortunately taken the heaviest casualties. After this initial setback, most offensive operations have been frozen to save face and obviate further casualties. The Maoists in turn have realised that it would be highly counter-productive for them to inflict further casualties on the CAPFs because it would generate pressures to bring in the Army. This the Maoists want to avoid at all costs at this stage. The key question is do we have to oblige them or conform to their game plan?
Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan have used staggering levels of force against insurgents in their own territories. The Sri Lankans waged a ruthless civil war employing offensive air and naval power, tanks and heavy artillery. The Sri Lankans have succeeded eminently in totally destroying the LTTE. It is one of the few examples of successful termination of a vicious insurgency that had reached the levels of a civil war
Today there is a clear need for a whole of the government approach. We cannot view the External and Internal Security threats in isolated compartments. The Chinese threat in Tibet has risen from 22 divisions in two seasons to over 34 divisions which can now be inducted in one season. The Indian Army will have to respond by raising at least 5 to 6 new divisions. We should raise them urgently. We could well blood them initially in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa before their committal to our Himalayan borders. There is a dire need to raise the right sort of Units that can deal both with the external and internal threat dimensions. Combatising the police is not a rational or cost-effective response. In such a combination threat scenario, raising more CRPF battalions will not really be a cost-effective option. These units are currently not in a shape to conduct offensive CI operations and will be absolutely of no use in any war with China or Pakistan. Raising infantry / mountain divisions for the Army is a far more rational and cost effective response in the current scenario.
Minimal vs proportional force
India simply cannot afford to retreat from its model of minimal military force in response to sub-conventional conflicts. In fact, in view of the exponential rise in the levels of violence, India may be forced to reconsider the term “Minimal force” and replace it with what Lt Gen Rustom Nanavaty terms “Proportional force”. The force used will have to be proportional to what is employed against us. Our pessimist and defeatist approach of just managing the levels of violence — needs to be replaced by a more proactive approach that seeks the successful termination of the insurgency (characterised by serious attrition on the insurgent organisation leading to a surrender of arms by “the insurgents” and their re-merger in the democratic mainstream). Managing conflicts may not be enough. We need to bring them to closure by using proportional levels of force. Internal conflicts cannot be allowed to drag on for decades. Such destabilising levels of restraint in military force usage are not cost-effective in the long term and the nation cannot afford this luxury just so that some hare-brained NGOs can score brownie points in Europe and elsewhere. It is the state’s duty to protect its citizens from the escalating levels of violence by non-state actors. We need to get our act together by a “whole of the government” approach that generates synergy between the various organs of the state as also the centre and the states. The time is ripe for a doctrinal debate across organisation boundaries.
In view of the exponential rise in the levels of violence, India may be forced to reconsider the term “Minimal force” and replace it with what Lt Gen Rustom Nanavaty terms “Proportional force”. The force used will have to be proportional to what is employed against us. Our pessimist and defeatist approach of just managing the levels of violence – needs to be replaced by a more proactive approach that seeks the successful termination of the insurgency (characterised by serious attrition on the insurgent organisation leading to a surrender of arms by “the insurgents” and their re-merger in the democratic mainstream). Managing conflicts may not be enough. We need to bring them to closure by using proportional levels of force
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